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CASES NOTED
BAIL'- UNAUTHORIZED ACCEPTANCE BY POLICE ORDER
The defendant, chief of police, accepted a cash deposit in lieu of bail for
the release of a prisoner even though this was not authorized by statute.
When the accused failed to appear to answer the charges, the defendant
misappropriated the money, and the municipality prosecuted him for
embezzlement. On appeal the conviction was reversed. Held, where the
chief of police does not have statutory authority to accept a cash deposit in
lieu of bail for the release of a prisoner, the prosecuting city does not
acquire such legal property interest as will warrant a conviction for em-
bezzlement.' Scarboro v. State, 62 S.E.2d 168 (Ga. 1950).
"To bail" is to deliver an accused to his surety to secure his appearance
in court to answer the purpose of his detention.2 "Bail" is the security
deposited by a surety, who procures the release of the prisoner by becom-
ing responsible for the appearance of the accused at the designated time
and place.3 The contract binding the relationship between the surety
and the government is sealed and is known as "bail bond." 4  The sole
object of bail bond in criminal cases is to assure the presence of the ac-
cused,5 all other considerations being secondary6 The authority to set and
grant bail is judicial or quasi-judicial 7 and is an inherent function of a
court which has the power to hear and determine the case at issue.8 At
common law police officers did not have this authority,9 such authority
depending upon statutory grant.' 0 Bail granted without authority is void
and does not bind the released prisoner or his surety.'
The bond can be met in almost any way in which any other legal
obligation can be satisfied: by the deposit of a certified check,' 2 govern-
1. GA. CODE ANN. § 26-2801 (1933).
2. State v. Springer, 206 La. 312, 19 So.Zd 147 (1944).
3. Whipple v. People, 40 Ill. App. 301 (1890).
4. State v. Clark, 234 Iowa 338. 16 N.W.2d 722 (1943).
5. Varholy v. Sweat, 153 Fla. 571, 15 So.2d 267 (1943).
6. Badolato v. Molinari, 106 Misc. 342, 174 N.Y. Supp. 512 (Sup. Ct. 1919).
7. Berkowitz v. United States, 90 F.2d 881 (8th Cir. 1937).
8. Sauskelonis v. Hefting, 89 Conn. 98, 94 At. 368 (1915).
9. Badolato v. Molinari, supra note 6.
10. Principe v. Ault, 62 F. Supp. 279 (1945); Young v. Stoutamire, 131 Fla. 525,
179 So. 797 (1938); Campbell v. Reno County, 97 Kan. 68, 154 Pac. 257 (1916);
Fleenor v. Commonwealth, 308 Ky. 1, 213 S.W.2d 313 (1947); State v. Altone, 140
Me., 210, 35 A.2d 859 (1944); Snyder v. Gross, 69 Neb. 340, 95 N.W. 636 (1903);
Doane v. Dalrymple, 79 N.J.L. 200, 74 At]. 964 (1909); People ex rel. Donavan v. Roun-
ati, 258 App. Div. 585, 17 N.Y.S.2d 199 (1st Dept. 1940); Ex parte Henderson, 27 N.D.
155, 145 N.W. 574 (1914); Ahsmuhs v. Bowyer, 39 Okla. 376, 135 Pac. 413 (1913).
11. Bongiovanni v. Ward, 50 F. Supp. 3 (D.C. Mass. 1943).
12. Campbell v. Reno County, supra note l0;'Ahsmuhs v. Bowyer, supra note 10.
MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
ment bonds,' 3 or cash.1 4 Vith an authorized acceptance of bail, the court
or officer acts as the state's agent, giving the state a legal interest in the
fund.15 However, when there is an unauthorized deposit of cash in lieu
of bail bond, there is a conflict as to the final disposition of the fund.
One line of cases holds that where cash is deposited without authority
in lieu of bail bond the release of the prisoner is void; and the deposit
belongs to the accused'" or the depositor" and is subject to immediate
refund.' 8  Another view is that the fund should be paid to the govern-
mental unit's treasury as if a recognizance,"' and neither the depositor nor
the accused nor their assignees have any right to it without the requisite
appearance.20 Nor can recovery be had in most jurisdictions from the
bondsman of an officer who takes an unauthorized cash deposit for the
release of a prisoner.2' As in the instant case, the officer is held in some
jurisdictions to be the trustee for the depositor22 or the accused;2 3 while
at least one court found that where a magistrate was authorized to set
and accept bail bond, but accepted a cash substitute, lie acted as trustee
for the state, making the release action valid.
2 4
For many years the defendant in the noted case had taken thousands
of dollars in lieu of bail bond for the release of prisoners in his custody.
This action was acquiesced in by the municipality, which had always ac-
cepted the money. Although the Georgia Code gives authority to sheriffs
13. Davis v. United States, 47 F. Supp. 176, aff'd, 135 F.2d 1013 (1942); State ex
rel. Oberrender v. Coleman, 149 la. 720, 7 So.2d 1 (1942).
14. State ex tel. Oberrender v. Coleman, suPra note 13 (each of two sureties put
up $500 of the required $1,500 in bonds and offered $500 in cash which was refused;
held, that the refusal was a denial of the right of bail).
15. Barron v. State, 150 Ark. 417, 234 S.W. 271 (1921); Tulare County v. Fenn,
47 Cal. App. 413, 190 Pac. 855 (1920); but see Paton v. Teeter, 37 Cal. App.2d 477, 99
P.2d 699 (1940) (where cash deposit in lieu of bail was turned over to the state by the
accepting officer, the forfeiting depositor was estopped to deny the authority in the police
officer to act for the state).
16. Rodman v. Superior Court, 13 Cal.2d 262, 89 P.2d 109 (1939); Trevathan v.
Mutual Life Ins. Co., 166 Ore. 515, 113 P.2d 621 (1941) (police officer has the author-
ity to take neither cash nor property).
17. State v. Altone, supra note 10 (by statute); Doane v. Dalrymple, supra note 10
trustee for depositor); Brasfield v. Town of Milan, 127 Tenn. 561, 155 S.W. 926 (1913)
(when prisoner failed to appear, depositor could recover); c. Snyder v. Gross, suptra note
10 (bondsman of justice of peace is not liable to depositor).
18. Brown v. O'Connell, 36 Conn. 432 (1870); Trevathan v. Mutual Life Ins. Co.,
supra note 15 (prisoner escaping on motorcycle which had been impounded to secure his
appearance was held to have superior right of possession over police).
19. Defined as an obligation of record by which a duty is secured. See Capital
Garage Co. v. Gordon, 99 Vt. 83, 130 At. 756 (1925).
20. Bryant v. City of Brisbee, 28 Ariz. 278, 237 Pac. 380 (1925); Kirsehbaum v.
Mayn, 76 Mont. 320, 246 Pac. 953 (1926); Moss v. Summit County, 60 Utah 252, 208
Pac. 507 (1922).
21. Snyder v. Gross, supra note 10. Contra, Litvinchuk v. Fassenbender, 305 II.
App. 230, 27 N.E.2d 305 (1940). Cf. Lennen v. Town of Belleville, 117 N.J.L. 156.
189 Atl. 652 (1937) (magistrate holds cash in trust for the accused regardless of who
made the deposit).
22. Snyder v. Gross, supra note 10.
23. Badolato v. Molinari, supra note 6.
24. Ahsmuhs v. Bowyer, supra note 10 (the court implied that the magistrate could
be held for embezzlement if and when apprehended.
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and constables to accept bail bond,25 it makes no mention of police officers,
and there is no provisions for taking cash substitutes. Since embezzlement
is a statutory offens& requiring that a definite legal relation exist between
the embezzler and the embezzled, 2 7 the finding that the accused was a
trustee for the depositor rather than for the municipality furnished a
legally sufficient rationale for the majority opinion. The dissent reasoned
that the absence of any specific inhibition in the Code against the ac-
ceptance of a substitute for bail bond, together with the long period of
ratification of the defendant's acts gave such color of authority to the
chief of police as would warrant finding the necessary relation to sustain
the conviction for embezzlement. 28
It is submitted that such strict adherence to the letter of the statute
prevented the merited punishment of a public official for an intended
criminal act which, under the agency rationale of the minority, was pun-
ishable. There being no judicial remedy left under the decision, it appears
highly desirable for the Georgia General Assembly to correct this anomalous
situation by appropriate legislation.
CONFLICT OF LAWS-CONTRIBUTION OF JOINT TORT-
FEASORS RESIDENTS OF DIFFERENT STATES
Plaintiff, an Ohio corporation, and defendant, a Pennsylvania resident,
as joint tort-feasors caused an accident in Ohio. Plaintiff paid an Ohio
judgment to an injured third party and sought indemnity or contribution
from the defendant in a Pennsylvania action. The Court of Common
Pleas granted full indemnity. Held, that indemnity cannot be granted where
plaintiff is a joint tort-feasor and that application of the Ohio law, which is
contra to Pennsylvania statute, precludes relief by way of contribution.
Builders Supply Co. v. McCabe, 366 Pa. 322, 77 A.2d 368 (1951).
The law with respect to indemnity and contribution is basically clear.
While indemnity is a right to full reimbursement' which springs from a
contract, 2 contribution is an apportionment of damages, " a right arising out
25. GA. CODE ANN. § 27-902 (1933).
26. GA. CODE ANN. § 26-2801 (1933); Hughes v. United States, 4 F.2d 686 (Sth
Cir. 1925); Fitch v. State, 135 Fla. 361, 185 So. 435 (1938).
27. People v. Hayes, 365 111. 318, 6 N.E.2d 645 (1937).
28. Scarboro v. State, 62 S.E.2d 168, 169 (Ga. 1950) (dissenting opinion by Atkin-
son, Presiding Justice).
1. Fidelity & Cas. Ins. Co. of N. Y. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 124 Conn. 227, 199
At. 93 (1938); Mo. Dist. Tel. Co. v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 338 Mo. 692, 93
S.W.2d 19 (1935); Lasher v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 253 App, Div. 564, 3 N. Y. S.
2d 32 (1938).
2. George's Radio v. Capital Transit Co., 126 F.2d 219 (D.C. Cir. 1942);
Shannon v. Mass. Bonding & Ins. Co., 62 F. Supp. 532 (D. C. La. 1945); Vandiver v.
Pollak, 107 Ala. 547, 19 So. 180 (1895); Little v. Miles, 213 Ark. 725, 212 S.W.2d 935
(1948).
3. St. Lewis v. Morrison, 50 F. Supp. 570 (D. C. Ky. 1943); 'In re Lohr's Estate,
